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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
confident they had accomplished. However, it is equally
possible that the citations since the passage of the Act were
never intended to be taken as confirmations of the minority
rule of the Commissioners' interpretation of Fletcher v.
Pullen, since that was never necessary for the decision in
hand.
The Court when presented once more with a proper case,
may find it desirable to clarify its position as to the real
effect of Section 16 on its former doctrine of partnership
by estoppel.
FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOCAL TRANSACTIONS
AFFECTING INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Consolidated Edison Company of New York v.
National Labor Relations Board'
In a proceeding under the National Labor Relations
Act2 to restrain alleged unfair labor practices on the part
of the petitioners, where the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board was contested on the ground that
the petitioners were engaged in intrastate production and
distribution of electric power and gas to local consumers,
but where it was shown that a small percentage of the pe-
titioners' output was utilized by certain consumers in the
maintenance and operation of instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, Held: (with two justices dissenting') that
the National Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction over
the petitioners' intrastate operations in order to prevent
labor disputes which might result in disrupting the peti-
tioners' service, hampering and obstructing the interstate
activities of the petitioners' customers.4
159 S. Ct. 206 (1938).
249 Stat. 449 (1935) ; 29 U. S. C. A. 151 et seq.
I Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented on this point, 59 S. Ct. 206,
221.
1 In addition to the question of jurisdiction, the point wirn which this
note is concerned, the case also involved a consideration of procedural
due process in the fairness of the hearings before the board and the
sufficiency of the evidence, and the power of the board to abrogate
contracts between the employer and an independent labor organization with-
out notice to that union. From the majority's opinion adverse to the
board on the latter point, Justices Reed and Black dissented, 59 S. Ct.
206, 224.
For additional discussion of the jurisdiction element of the case, see
(1939) 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 480, (1939) 24 Iowa L. Rev. 373, (1939) 48 Labor
Review 121. For a discussion of the due process point, see (1939) 48
Labor Review 121, 123.
For a discussion of the invalidation of union contracts, see (1939)
6 U. Chi. L. Rev. 319; (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 695, (1939) 48 Labor Re-
view 121, 124.
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The petitioners, the Consolidated Edison Company of
New York, Inc., and its affiliates, were public utilities serv-
ing about three and a half million customers in New York
City and Westchester County, New York. While the peti-
tioners received supplies of coal, oil, etc. from without the
state, their gas and electricity was sold and transmitted to
customers wholly within the State of New York. None of
their products was sold for resale in interstate commerce.
By far the greater proportion of the petitioners' gas and
electricity was utilized for purely local purposes such as
residential and domestic use. However, among the petition-
ers' customers were several railroads which were engaged
in interstate commerce and which consumed the electric
power supplied by the petitioners in connection with the
operation of freight and passenger depots and in the move-
ment of trains. The petitioners furnished the major part
of the electricity for New York's airport and for the piers
of foreign and coastal steamship lines. Interstate and for-
eign telephone, telegraph, and radio communications were
received and transmitted by use of power supplied by the
petitioners. The petitioners' electricity was also utilized
by the Federal Government for the operation of lighthouses,
beacons, and other navigation aids.
While interstate commerce does not include production
and local sales and transactions, 5 it is a familiar principle
that industrial and commercial matters which, in them-
selves, are essentially intrastate but which influence and
affect interstate commerce may be subjected to federal reg-
ulation. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Federal Government
to regulate intrastate freight rates to protect interstate
commerce from discrimination has been upheld,6 and the
power of the Federal Government to prevent intrastate
trade practices and transactions harmful to interstate com-
merce7 or impeding the flow of the "stream of commerce"s
has been sustained.
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 S. Ct. 6. 32 L. Ed. 346 (1888) ; United
States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 S. Ct. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325 (1895) ;
see also Utah Light and Power Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, 52 S. Ct. 548,
76 L. Ed. 1038 (1932).
0The Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833, 58 L. Ed. 1341
(1914) ; Railroad Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563,
43 S. Ct. 232, 66 L. Ed. 371 (1922); Florida v. United States, 282 U. S.
194, 51 S. Ct. 119, 75 L. Ed. 291 (1931).
7Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 24 S. Ct.
436, 48 L. Ed. 676 (1904); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct.
301, 52 L. Ed. 488 (1905); United States v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549, 47 S.
Ct. 169, 71 L. Ed. 403 (1926); Bradford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen
Stone Cutter's Ass'n., 274 U. S. 37, 47 S. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916 (1927);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 163, 51 S. Ct. 421, 75 L.
19391
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The power of the national government to safeguard in-
terstate commerce from burdensome intrastate activities
and conditions has been limited in its scope to include only
those local matters which directly and immediately affect
interstate commerce.9 In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.," the
test of federal power in this field was reduced to an almost
mechanical formula. If the first effect of the intrastate
matter or activity were not communicated directly to in-
terstate commerce, but to some intervening agency which
in turn transmitted it to interstate commerce, the influence
was said to be remote and secondary and the Federal Gov-
ernment to be without jurisdiction, irrespective of the ex-
tent or magnitude of the effect upon interstate commerce.
Thus, labor relations in the production of coal destined for
interstate commerce were held beyond the reach of federal
supervision for such labor relations affected coal produc-
tion immediately and interstate commerce was affected only
indirectly.
Within less than a year, however, the test developed and
applied in the Carter case was shelved. In National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.," the
Court declared that the question of whether or not the
particular intrastate activity was subject to federal reu-
lation was to be decided not on the basis of the mechanics
whereby its influence was brought to bear on interstate
commerce but on whether it exerted a "substantial" effect
on such commerce. The answer was not to be found in the
"intellectual vacuum" of a rigid academic formula but
through a factual approach to the problem and a consider-
ation of the degree of influence actually exerted.12  Apply-
ing the standard of "substantial effect", the Court held
that federal regulatory jurisdiction might properly be as-
Ed. 926 (1931); Local 167 v. United States, 291 U. S. 293, 54 S. Ct.
396, 78 L. Ed. 804 (1934).
Swift v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 25 S. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518
(1905); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 S. Ct. 397, 66 L. Ed. 735
(1922); Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470,
67 L. Ed. 839 (1923) ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S.
420, 50 S. Ct. 220, 74 L. Ed. 524 (1930).
0 Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed.
1570 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855,
80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936).
10 Supra, n. 9.11National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937).
1 The Court did not expressly overrule the Carter case, 8upra, note 9,
but purported to distinguish it as dealing with regulations which went
"beyond any sustainable measure of the protection of Interstate com-
merce," while It declared that in the Schechter case, supra, note 9, the
effect "was so remote as to be beyond the federal power."
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serted over labor relations in local production activities
where the raw materials were derived from interstate
sources and the major portion of the finished product was
destined for interstate commerce." Subsequently, in Santa
Cruz Fruit Packing Company v. National Labor Relations
Board,14 the Court held that even where the raw materials
were locally obtained but where the finished product was
sold in interstate commerce to a "substantial extent", local
processing and production might be regulated under the
National Labor Relations Act. In that case, 37% of the
cannery's output was sold in interstate commerce.
In the principal case, the Court declared that the dis-
ruption of the facilities of interstate and foreign carriers and
communications which might be induced by a discontinu-
ance of service by the petitioners due to industrial strife
demonstrated that the effect upon interstate commerce was
not remote, but "close" and "intimate". Citing and ap-
plying the principles laid down in the Jones and Laughlin
and Santa Cruz cases, the Court characterized influences
substantial in degree as immediate and direct.11  Hence, in
order to forestall the burdening and hampering of inter-
state and foreign commerce, the Federal Government,
through the National Labor Relations Board, might assert
jurisdiction over labor relations in the petitioners' intra-
state public utility enterprises.
It is to be noted that in the principal case the Court
expressly recognized that the petitioners sold no power
directly in interstate commerce or for resale therein. Fur-
thermore, the Court declared that in reaching its conclu-
sion it attached no significance to the fact that certain of
the petitioners' supplies were derived from sources out-
side of the State of New York. The petitioners were held
to be subject to the provisions of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act because power sold and transmitted by them to
intrastate customers was used, in turn, by certain of these
customers in the operation and maintenance of facilities of
11 See also: National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Com-
pany, 301 U. S. 49, 57 S. Ct. 642, 81 L. Ed. 918; National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58, 57
S. Ct. 645, 81 L. Ed. 921; Associated Press v. National Labor Relations
Board, 301 U. S. 103, 57 S. Ct. 650, 81 L. Ed. 953; Washington, Virginia
& Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142,
57 S. Ct. 648, 81 L. Ed. 965, all of which were decided on the same day
as the Jones & Laughlin case, supra, n. 11.
" 303 U. S. 453, 58 S. Ct. 656, 82 L. Ed. 954 (1938).
15 The majority opinion does not even mention the Schechter and the
Carter cases, 8upra, n. 9, but an adherence to these cases formed the




interstate and foreign commerce, and the Court gave no
heed to the fact that the power so utilized represented but
a comparatively small proportion of the petitioners' total
output.16
The decision in the principal case, taken in connection
with the other Labor Board cases17 commented upon above,
naturally gives rise to an inquiry as to the extent to which
the doctrine of "substantial extent" is to be carried. Un-
der the prevailing Supreme Court view, the jurisdiction
of the Federal Government over an intrastate industrial
enterprise apparently is not hampered by the enterprise's
relative unimportance to interstate commerce in goods of
the type produced,18 or by interstate* commerce's relative
unimportance to the particular producer in absorbing its
output or in supplying it with raw materials,19 or, as in the
principal case, by the fact that its goods become identified
with interstate commerce through their use by persons
other than the producer. While in this group of cases, the
jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government was in
the field of labor relations, obviously a parity of reasoning
will sustain federal regulation of numerous other aspects
of intrastate industrial and commercial activity. In the
instant case, the petitioners, insofar as their own activities
were concerned, were actually further removed from inter-
state commerce than any of the industrial units involved
in the other cases of this group. The Court found the basis
for federal regulatory power in the "substantial" influ-
ence exerted over interstate commerce by reason of the use
of the petitioners' product therein by certain of the peti-
tioners' customers. What may be said of the importance
of availability of electric power to interstate commerce may,
by analogy, be applied to a vast multitude of other prod-
ucts and services used and sold therein and upon which the
16 While state labor relations legislation similar in operation and ob-
jectives to that of the Federal Government does not preclude the asser-
tion of paramount federal jurisdiction in this field when interstate
commerce is affected, the Court intimated that the existence and en-
forcement of such State regulation might be viewed as one of the ele-
ments of fact to be taken into consideration in determining whether
the exercise of federal jurisdiction is justified. However, this question is
not directly presented in the principal case as no proceedings had been
taken under the New York Labor Relations Act (Laws of 1937, Chapter
443; Art. 20 of the Labor Law, Consol. Laws, C. 31. Sec. 700 et seq.
1, Supra, notes 11, 13, 14.
Is Relatively small and unimportant manufacturing enterprises were in-
volved in the Friedman-Harry Marks case, supra, n. 13, and the Santa Cruz
case, 8upra, n. 14.
11 Raw materials and supplies were derived from intrastate sources in
the Santa Cruz case, 8spra, note 15. In the principal case, the Court ex-
pressly laid aside any consideration of the interstate sources of certain
of the petitioners' supplies.
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dependence of interstate commerce varies only in degree, if
at all, from the need for electric energy illustrated in the
principal case. It will require no reversal or modification
of the trend of these decisions to sustain extensions of Fed-
eral authority into fields which until very recently had been
viewed as exclusively local.
Book Review
READINGS ON PERSONAL PROPERTY. By William T. Fryer.
St. Paul. West Publishing Co. 1938. Pp. xxxii, 1184.
For a considerable period the law reviews of this coun-
try have been producing comprehensive and scholarly arti-
cles and comments upon numerous controversial questions
of law which daily confront the profession. Most of these
articles and comments have been written, after thorough
and complete investigations of all adjudicated cases, by
writers who have spent much time qualifying themselves
in their particular fields. Unfortunately, the products of
this research have never been fully utilized by the bench
and bar. Much criticism has been directed at law reviews
on the ground that their articles and comments have been
written in such a style as to be unintelligible to lawyers not
familiar with the problem and cases involved. This is prob-
ably true. But, to a lawyer who is confronted by the very
problem in his practice such an article or comment can have
inestimable value in preparing the particular case for
trial.
Probably the reason why these articles and comments
have not been more fully utilized by lawyers is because
they are unaware of their existence at the time of their
need. Few lawyers can or do subscribe for many of these
periodicals; and even where the local bar library maintains
a complete collection of them the index systems are so cum-
berson and unsatisfactory as to make them of little use to
the profession. A need has been felt for some system
whereby the outstanding articles and comments on a par-
ticular subject can be assembled into one or two volumes so
as to be available to the bench and bar. The Association
of American Law Schools has appreciated this need and
has already sponsored such compilations both for Con-
tracts and Constitutional Law, and plans others.
1939]
